

Message Text

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51

ACTION SS-25

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R 140910Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2142

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 2298

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AF, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS

REF: A) STATE 84088; B) ISLAMABAD 3142

SUMMARY: DEPFBNMIN ABDULLAH AND I WENT AT THE SUBJECT OF AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS FOR AN HOUR APRIL 13. THERE STILL SEEMS TO BE LITTLE REASON TO HOPE FOR ANY FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION. BUT THE TRANSIT TRADE PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED FOR THE PRESENT AND THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN REDUCING THE VITRIOLIC AD HOMINEM PROPAGANDA. DAOUD'S VISIT TO TEHRAN AND TALKS WITH THE SHAH REPRESENT THE NEXT SIGNIFICANT EVENT AFFECTING PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF A I CALLED ON DEPFONMIN ABDULLAH AND HAD HOUR LONG CONVERSATION WITH HIM EVENING APRIL 13. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I WOULD BE SPEAKING ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS I HAD RECEIVED AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO HAVE WITH AFGHANISTAN.

2. TRANSIT FACILITIES. I TOLD ABDULLAH THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS CHARGES THAT THE PAKISTANIS ARE BLOCKING THE

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TRANSIT BY RAIL OF GOODS DESTINED FOR AFGHANISTAN FROM THE

PORT OF KARACHI. I STRESSED THAT WE WOULD NOT SEEK TO PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MERELY ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THE FACTS AND ARE MAKING NO JUDGMENTS. I THEN BRIEFED ABDULLAH ON THE INFORMATION WE HAD OBTAINED FROM PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES PER PARAS 6 AND 7 REF B. I CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE DENIED THAT ANY POLITICAL FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF RAILWAY WAGONS AVAILABLE FOR AFGHAN TRANSIT GOODS.

3. ABDULLAH RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE PAKISTANIS ARE "TOTALLY LYING." WITH REGARD TO THE DELAYED FERTILIZER SHIPMENT, HE SAID THAT THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES HAD PROVIDED NO LABOR FOR THE UNLOADING OF THE SHIP AND NO STORAGE FACILITIES. THE UNLOADING HAD FINALLY BEEN DONE "BY OUR PUSHTUN BROTHERS". HE ALSO REFERRED TO A SUGAR SHIPMENT FOR WHICH THERE HAD BEEN PROVIDED NO UNLOADING OR STORAGE FACILITIES AND WHICH THEREFORE HAD BEEN SHIPPED INSTEAD TO AND THROUGH IRAN AT A MUCH HIGHER COST. ABDULLAH SAID THAT THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE PORT AUTHORITIES IN KARACHI HAVE TOLD THE APPROPRIATE AFGHAN OFFICIALS THAT NO REPEAT NO RAILWAY WAGONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR AFGHAN GOODS. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY OTHER AMBASSADOR BESIDES MYSELF WITH WHOM HE HAS RAISED THIS MATTER IS THE SOVIET AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROMISED TO COOPERATE FULLY IN MEETING AFGHAN NEEDS FOR TRANSIT FACILITIES. HE FURTHER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR ON APRIL 14. COMMENT: ABDULLAH CALLJID ME MORNING APRIL 14 TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED BY THE PAK CHARGE' THAT 20 WAGONS PER DAY WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR AFGHAN TRANSIT TRANSIT TRADE AND THAT THIS MEETS BASIC AFGHAN NEEDS FOR THE TIME BEING.

4. PROPAGANDA. AFTER REFERRING TO OUR SATISFACTION AT THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE NORMALIZATION OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS, I TOLD ABDULLAH THAT WE REGRET THAT NO SIMILAR PROGRESS IS BEING MADE WITH RESPECT TO AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS. I SAID THAT WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEVEL AND TONE OF PROPAGANDA BEING EXCHANGED, ESPECIALLY BROADCASTS IN EFFECT CALLING FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF THE TWO LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. (SEPTTEL REPORTS THAT THE PAKISTANIS ARE NOW MATCHING THE AFGHANS IN THIS ASPECT.) I SAID THAT ZY UNDER-CONFIDENTIAL

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STOOD WHY, IN THE HEATED DAYS WOLLOWING THE WALI KHAN AND NAP ARRESTS BY THE GOP, THE GOA HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACCEPT SENATOR PERCY'S PROPOSAL FOR THE CESSATION OF PROPAGANDA, DESPITE THE GOP'S ACCEPTANCE, BUT THAT WE NEVERTHELESS REGRET THAT THE GOA FOUND THIS PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE. I SUGGESTED THAT THE GOA MIGHT TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE ADVANTAGES THAT MIGHT ACCRUE TO IT FROM AN AGREEMENT STOPPING PROPAGANDA. THESE ADVANTAGES WOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE REMOVAL OF AN

IRRITANT IN AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS AND THE LESSENING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PROPAGANDA SPARKING A MORE SERIOUS CRISIS, BUT ALSO THE ENHAMCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION OF THE GOA. I REFERRED TO THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE INDIANS AND THE PAKS IN REDUCING THEIR PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT EACH OTHER DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM SUCH AS KASHMIR.

5. ABDULLAH RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE GOP HAD STARTED THE USE OF VITRIOLIC PROPAGANDA AND THE GOA HAD FELT OBLIGED TO ANSWER IN KIND. HE SAID THAT HE DEPLORES PROPAGANDA INCITING PEOPLE TO TERROR AND ASSASSINATION BUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAS HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ENGAGE IN SUCH BROADCASTS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT IS BEING SAID ON THE PAKISTANI RADIOS. IN FACT, HE SAID, THE GOA HAS NOT YET EVEN BEGUN TO USE ITS COMPLETE FILE ON BHUTTO WHICH SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY, ACCORDING TO ABDULLAH, THAT HIS MOTHER WAS A HINDU WHORE IN BOMBAY AND THAT HE HIMSELF HAS ENGAGED IN HOMOSEFNAL ACTIVITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, IF THE PAKISTANIS STOP THEIR PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE AFGHAN LEADERS, THE GOA WOULD STOP ITS PERSONALSFTTACKS ON THE PAK LEADERS. BUT, HE ADDED, WHILE AFGHANISTAN'S "PUSHTUN AND BALUCHI BROTHERS" ARE IN JAIL AND OTHERWISE BEING PERSECUTED, THE GOA CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT ENTIRELY STOP ITS PROPRAGANDA BORADCASTS. IT COULD ONLY CONSIDER SUCH A CESSATION IF THE GOP WERE TO TAKE MAJOR STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION OF THE PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS, FOR EXAMPLE IF THE PAKISTANI SUPREME COURT WERE TO "FREE THE NAP LEADERS."

6. THE USSR. I TOLD ABDULLAH THAT WE CONCURRED IN HIS STATEMENT TO ME ON APRIL 7 THAT ONLY THE SOVIETS WOULD BENEFIT FROM WORSENING AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS. I SAID THAT OUR VIEW IS THAT GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND REGIONAL STABILITY ARE ESSENTIAL TO AFGHAN SECURITY. ABDULLAH FOR THE ONLY TIME IN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE CONVERSATION LOOKED SOMEWHAT NERVOUS AND SAID THAT HE HOPED HIS REMARK ABOUT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT LEAK. I ASSURE HIM THAT I WAS USING A CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. LATER IN OUR CONVERSATION, HE SAID THAT THE DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON AFGHAN SECURITY,

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CLEARLY IMPLYING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SUCH AN EVENT.

7. PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I SAID THAT AS HE KNEW THE USG SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN. WE THEREFORE WELCOME AFGHAN STATEMENTS THAT AFGHANISTAN HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIM ON PAKISTAN. BUT I ADDED THAT WE ARE VERY MUCH DISTURBED BY HIS STATEMENT TO ME ON APRIL 7 THAT AFGHANISTAN MIGHT MAKE A CLAIM TO PAKISTAN TERRITORY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. I SAID THAT THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING ON AFGHAN-US RELATIONS, WOULD BE INCALCULABLE.

8. ABDULLAH RESPONDED THAT THE GOA DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO TAKE SUCH A STEP BUT WOULD HAVE TO IF PUSHED INTO IT BY THE GOP. HE SAID THAT THE GOA HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ALL ASPECTS OF TAKING SUCH A STEP INCLUDING ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT, HE SAID, THE FOA'S STRONG PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO ATTEMPT TO START UP THE DIALOGUE WITH THE GOP WHICH ABORTED IN FEBRUARY. IF THE GOP SHOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT GESTURE WITH RESPECT TO THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCHIS, SUCH A DIALOGUE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

9. GUERRILLAS. I TOLD ABDULLAH THAT WE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO HEAR FROM HIM THAT THERE IS NO TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN AND CONFIDENTIAL

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NO DESPATCHING FROM AFGHANISTAN OF GUERRILLAS OR TERRORISTS. I SAID THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD OF COURSE CAUSE A SHARP PAKISTANI RESPONSE WITH OBVIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIONAL STABILITY.

10. ABDULLAH RESPONDED SOMEWHAT OBLIQUELY THAT I MUST OF COURSE BE AWARE THAT PUSHTUNS ACROSS THE BORDER HABITUALLY CARRY WEAPONS AND ARE SUFFICIENTLY WELL SUPPLIED WITH BOMBS WHICH THEY MANUFACTURE THEMSELVES. NO DOUBT, HE SAID, THE TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE PUSHTUN AREAS OF PAKISTAN IF CARRIED OUT BY PUSHTUNS WHO RESIDE THERE. BUT HE SAID, THESE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT AFGHAN AGENTS. HE ADDED THAT IT IS OF COURSE ABSURD TO THINK THERE ARE AFGHAN AGENTS WHO ARE STIRRING UP THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE SIND.

11. COMMENT: THIS ALL ADDS UP TO A RATHER BLEAK PICTURE. THE UNDERLYING REALITY IS THAT AS LONG AS DAOUD IS IN CHARGE IN AFGHANISTAN, HE WILL KEEP THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE ALIVE. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, THE JOB FOR US DIPLOMATS IS TO TRY TO KEEP THIS ISSUE FROM GETTING OUT OF CONTROL.

12. THERE IS, IT SEEMS TO ME, SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THE VITRIOLIC AD HOMINEM PROPAGANDA CAN BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED. IF THIS IS TO BE DONE, I BELIEVE IT WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE PAKISTANIS. I AM NOT OF COURSE IN A POSITION HERE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE GOP TO TAKE SUCH A STEP BUT, IF THE DEPARTMENT WISHES, I COULD ASK ABDULLAH WHETHER HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE US RELAY TO THE GOP HIS STATEMENT THAT THE GOA WOULD STOP THAT KIND OF PROPAGANDA IF THE GOP WOULD DO SO FIRST.

13. WITH REGARD TO THE TRANSIT TRADE, THIS PROBLEM SEEMS PRESENTLY UNDER CONTROL.

14. FINALLY, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO DISCUSS THIS SITUATION IN SOME DETAIL WITH THE IRANIANS PRIOR TO DAOUD'S APRIL 27-MAY 1 VISIT TO IRAN. ANY SUCH DISCUSSION SHOULD, I THINK, BE AT A HIGH AND CONFIDENTIAL LEVEL, AND THE IRANIANS WOULD HAVE TO APPROACH THIS SUBJECT WITH DAOUD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE ESTABLISHED A FRANK AND EASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SHAH AND DAOUD. THIS
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WILL BE A DIFFICULT BUT IMPORTANT TASK FOR IRANIAN DIPLOMACY.

15. IT ALSO SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT, AS STATED IN KABUL 2224, A PRINCIPAL MOTIVATION OF THE GOA IN HAVING ABDULLAH RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH ME IS TO ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE US FROM SUPPLYING SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN.
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